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Abstract 
Conventional credit card transactions are not consistent with Islamic principles, as exemplified by 
the Islamic banking system and the ‘Murabaha sale’. Thus, if Islamic principles are to be applied 
to e-commerce, where credit card transactions are the norm, a new and secure electronic payment 
process is required. In this paper we present a method for secure electronic Murabaha 
transactions. After introducing the notion of Murabaha sale within the Islamic banking 
framework, we describe a general model for a secure electronic Murabaha transaction, and then 
consider the associated security risks. Security requirements are then identified for a secure 
electronic Murabaha transaction. We then present the Secure Electronic Murabaha Transaction 
(SEMT), designed to address the identified security requirements. Finally, we analyse how the 
proposed protocol matches the identified security requirements. 
1. Introduction 
The emergence of the Internet has led to the development of new electronic commerce (e-
commerce) protocols that seek to reduce both the cost of buying goods as well as the merchant’s 
cost of selling. One of the most important enablers of an e-commerce transaction is the secure 
Internet payment. Although several e-payment protocols have been proposed, e.g. SET [5], no 
protocol has to date been proposed to allow electronic sales based on Islamic banking principles. 
 One of the key concepts of the Islamic economic system is the prohibition of payment 
and receipt of interest on deposits and loans. Instead, it encourages the sharing of profits and losses 
among parties to any business transaction. It is thought that this will ensure the de-linking of 
economic gains from risk-taking. The notion of interest as a reward for delaying consumption is 
rejected in Islam, on the grounds that people can only be rewarded for their efforts, not for mere 
waiting. 
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Modern banking systems were introduced into the Muslim countries in the late 19th century. Many 
Muslims confined their involvement with these banks to transaction activities such as current 
accounts and money transfers. Borrowing from banks was strictly avoided in order to avoid 
dealing in interest, which is prohibited in Islam. 
 Islamic banks offer financial instruments that are consistent with Islamic religious beliefs. 
According to Islamic law, the mode of finance should emphasize profit and loss sharing. One of 
the most widely used transactions in Islamic banking is Murabaha [2]. 
 Although it is difficult to obtain exact figures on the size of the Islamic financial sector, it 
is nevertheless experiencing strong growth. According to [3], the assets of Islamic banks grew 
from $5 billion in 1985 to a level of over $100 billion in the late nineties. While conventional 
banks guarantee the capital and rate of return, the Islamic banking system, working on the 
principle of profit and loss sharing, cannot, by definition, guarantee any fixed rate of return on 
deposits.  
 Islamic law puts many restrictions on contracts to attain maximal justice in a financial 
transaction, minimise the potential for legal disputes, and build a healthy and stable financial and 
economic system [1]. Hasanin [2] notes that Murabaha is the most frequently used mode of 
contract by Islamic banks, accounting for 90 percent of all financing provided by some Islamic 
banks. 
2. Murabaha Sale 
Sale is defined in Islamic law as the exchange of a thing of value by another thing of value with 
mutual consent. Islamic jurisprudence has specified that the subject of sale must be in the 
ownership of the seller at the time of sale. What the seller does not own, cannot be sold. If 
something is sold before acquiring ownership, the sale is void. 
 Islamic banks have devised a number of products based on the religious beliefs associated 
with risk and profit sharing. Murabaha sale is one of the most commonly used forms of financing 
provided by Islamic banks. The Islamic bank purchases the goods and then re-sells them to a buyer 
at a mark-up, as agreed to by both parties. 
 Murabaha is an Arabic term that means profit and is a type of trust trading. Financially, it 
means cost plus profit sale, but, in Islamic law, it refers to a particular kind of sale [2]. 
 Islamic financial institutions now use Murabaha sale as a mode of financing. A customer 
wishing to purchase goods requests the financial institution to purchase these items on his behalf 
and then sell them to him with a certain amount of profit agreed upon added to the initial cost. The 
basic component of Murabaha is that the seller discloses the actual cost he has incurred in 
acquiring the goods, and then adds some profit thereon.  
 With Murabaha the financial institution buys the goods on behalf of the client and resells 
them at a mark-up, but in the period up to the resale the bank has title to the goods, and hence a 
legal responsibility. 
2.1  Rules Governing a Murabaha Sale 
The validity of a Murabaha transaction depends on certain conditions, which should be properly 
observed to make the transaction acceptable in Islamic law. In order to understand these conditions 
correctly, one should appreciate that Murabaha is a sale that has its own implications, and that all 
the basic ingredients of a valid sale should be present in Murabaha. The rules that govern this 
principle, as stated by [2], are as follows. 
• The two sale contracts, one through which the financial institution acquires the 
commodity and the other through which it sells it to the buyer, should be separate and real 
transactions. 
• The financial institution must own the commodity before it is sold to the buyer. It is 
essential to the validity of the Murabaha transaction that the buyer must be aware of the 
original price, including the costs necessary to obtain the commodity and the profit. This 
is because Murabaha is a sale with a mark-up, and if the buyer did not know the basic 
price then the sale is void.  
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• Both parties, i.e. the financial institution and the buyer, have to agree on the profit for the 
financial institution from the sale, where the sum of the cost and profit is equal to the 
selling price charged by the financial institution.  
• Murabaha is valid only where the exact cost of a commodity can be ascertained. If the 
exact cost cannot be ascertained, the commodity cannot be sold on a Murabaha basis. 
• It is also necessary for the validity of Murabaha that the commodity is purchased from a 
third party. The purchase of the commodity from the client on a “buy back” agreement is 
not allowed in Islamic law. Murabaha based on a “buy back” agreement would be nothing 
more than an interest-based transaction. 
Unless these conditions are fully observed, a Murabaha transaction becomes invalid under Islamic 
law. 
3. Electronic Murabaha Transaction Payment Model 
In this section, we describe our model of an electronic Murabaha transaction. The model identifies 
the entities involved and includes a brief description of their interactions. 
3.1 Entities involved 
An electronic Murabaha transaction involves interactions between three parties: the buyer, the 
merchant and the provider. Their roles are straightforward. 
• Buyer: This is the entity that wishes to buy goods from a merchant, but does not have the 
cash immediately available to complete the transaction. 
• Merchant: This is the entity that offers the goods which the buyer wishes to purchase. 
• Provider: This is a financial institution that acts as an intermediary between the buyer 
and the merchant. It undertakes the purchase of commodities as specified by a buyer, and 
then resells them on Murabaha to him for the cost price plus a margin of profit agreed 
upon previously by the two parties. It does not make a purchase unless the buyer requests 
it and makes a prior promise to purchase. 
 Trust is a critical issue in payment systems. In our model, we assume that both the buyer 
and the merchant trust the provider. This trust is explicit as both the buyer and the merchant have a 
formally established agreement with the provider that defines the trust and liability relationship, 
while we do not assume trust between the buyer and the merchant. 
3.2 Interactions 
In the proposed electronic Murabaha transaction model, the buyer shopping at an Internet 
merchant site first chooses to pay using Murabaha through a specified provider. The merchant 
redirects the buyer to the provider to complete the purchase on his behalf. If the provider chooses 
to proceed with sale, he will calculate his profit, and sends a promise to sell the goods to the buyer 
once they have been bought. In return, the buyer promises the provider to buy the goods on 
Murabaha sale for the cost of the goods plus the agreed upon profit. This promise is not binding on 
either the buyer or the provider, and is not an actual sale. It is just a promise to effect a sale in 
future on the basis of Murabaha. At this stage the relationship between the provider and the buyer 
is that of a promisor and a promisee. 
 Based on the goods description supplied to the provider, he communicates with the 
merchant Internet site and completes the purchase of the goods. The provider is in a better position 
to obtain payment discounts from the merchant, who in most cases will prefer dealing with a 
provider as the merchant will receive payment more quickly and with less risk. 
 Once the purchase of the goods is settled between the provider and the merchant, the 
provider notifies the buyer of completion of the purchase. Now, the buyer sends his payment 
authorisation to buy the goods from the provider on Murabaha. 
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4. Security requirements for an electronic Murabaha transaction 
In order to understand how to make an electronic Murabaha transaction secure, we will start by 
identifying the risks in the internet environment and the resulting security requirements for all the 
participants in such a transaction. 
4.1 Security Risks 
The most likely motive for any attack on an electronic Murabaha transaction would be financial 
gain. This could be accomplished by creating fraudulent electronic representations of the payment 
instruction that are accepted as genuine by the provider, or by stealing data from the buyer. If 
successful this would cause financial loss to the participants and financial gain to the attacker. 
Alternatively, an attack on an electronic Murabaha transaction might be motivated not by financial 
gain but by a desire to disrupt a particular system and/or cause losses to one or more of the 
legitimate parties. The primary areas of vulnerability in an electronic Murabaha transaction system 
are the computers used in the system, and the messages transmitted between the participants [6]. 
4.1.1 Unauthorised access to data in computers 
An attacker might gain access to a buyer computer and fraudulently utilize the data stored on the 
computer. For example, insertion of a malicious program into a buyer’s computer might enable the 
attacker to copy or modify payment instructions. Such unauthorised use of buyer payment 
instructions might only be detected after the buyer received an account statement from the 
provider, by which time the attacker may already have obtained the desired financial benefit. 
4.1.2 Alteration of messages 
An attacker could attempt to delete messages, replay messages, or substitute an altered message 
for a valid one. Critical data in a message, such as the price, could be changed and the message 
then retransmitted to its intended recipient. Messages authorising the sale could be copied and 
replayed to the provider in an attempt to repeat transactions on behalf of the buyer. 
4.1.3 Impersonation 
An attacker with access to the network between the buyer’s web browser and the merchant server 
can take advantage of this access to read and rewrite traffic. Imagine a buyer communicating with 
a merchant server. The attacker, monitoring communications between the buyer and merchant site, 
watches for an HTTP redirect to the Provider. In the scheme described below, the merchant site is 
required to perform this redirection at the beginning of an electronic Murabaha transaction. Seeing 
this redirection, the attacker intercepts the packet and rewrites the URL in the redirection to a 
previously established bogus Provider server. This server then acts as a proxy between the buyer 
and the Provider, and between the buyer and merchant site, impersonating the Provider service to 
the buyer and vice versa while rewriting all URLs and HTTP redirects to force traffic through the 
proxy. An attacker could thereby obtain the buyer’s payment details and subsequently use them 
fraudulently. 
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4.1.4 Repudiation of transaction 
Fraud could also be attempted through repudiation of transactions. For example, a buyer could 
deny that he had authorised a particular Murabaha transaction which has previously been 
performed. This could cause losses to the provider. 
4.1.5 Unauthorised disclosure of data 
An interceptor of transaction messages between a genuine buyer and a provider could learn the 
identity of the buyer, as well as details of the transaction (e.g. price, nature of goods, etc.). In some 
circumstances this would be an undesirable breach of user privacy. 
4.1.6 Denial of service 
The distributed nature of an electronic Murabaha transaction makes it vulnerable to denial of 
service attacks. Obviously, as the usefulness of a system like this increases in proportion to the 
number of merchants who support the payment method, the effects of a denial of service attack on 
a provider are potentially severe. 
4.2 Security requirements 
We next identify what security services are required to combat the threats identified in the 
previous section.  
4.2.1 Confidentiality 
Confidentiality for information exchanged between the electronic Murabaha transaction 
participants is needed. This is especially important in an internet environment where information 
may travel through network segments that are not necessarily trusted [6]. This security service can 
be sub-divided into the following. 
1. The buyer needs to keep his personal data and payment details secret from outsiders. A 
non-authorised user should not have access to the transaction details. Moreover, the 
identity of the buyer must remain anonymous to the merchant. 
2. The provider needs to be sure that his transaction information, e.g. pricing, is protected 
from outsiders. 
4.2.2 Authentication 
Authentication provides guarantees regarding the identity of the originator of an action [6]. This 
security service can be sub-divided into the following: 
1. The buyer needs assurance that he is being redirected to a genuine provider. Otherwise he 
might be paying an attacker. 
2. The provider needs to authenticate the buyer to prove that he is the legitimate source of 
the payment instruction received. 
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4.2.3 Integrity 
Integrity ensures that information is not altered by unauthorised persons during transmission, 
without detection by electronic Murabaha transaction participants [6]. This security service can be 
sub-divided into the following. 
1. The buyer must be aware of the original price of the goods and the amount of profit the 
provider is charging him before buying the goods. 
2. The buyer requires a proof that the provider owns the goods being offered. 
3. The provider must be in possession of a proof that the buyer has authorised the payment 
for the goods using Murabaha sale. 
4. No attacker can authorise a false payment on behalf of a buyer. 
5. The buyer payment authorisation must be protected against alteration, or any alteration 
must be detectable. 
5. The SEMT Protocol 
We now describe the proposed Secure Electronic Murabaha Transaction (SEMT) protocol in 
detail. SEMT consists of four phases: the Transaction request phase, in which the buyer finds 
goods he wishes to buy at an Internet merchant site, and decides to use Murabaha to pay for the 
goods; the Promising phase, invoked by the provider, wherein the provider promises to sell the 
buyer the goods he is interested in, while the buyer promises to buy the goods from the provider, 
once the provider has ownership; the Purchase phase, invoked by the provider, wherein he buys 
the goods requested by the buyer from the merchant, and the Murabaha phase, invoked by the 
provider, wherein the buyer validates the provider’s ownership of the goods offered and sends 
authorisation to the provider to buy the goods at the agreed price.  
 Initial registration of both buyer and merchant to the provider is necessary. The public 
keys (encryption and signature verification) of both entities are certified by the provider. 
Moreover, merchant and buyer receive the public key (encryption and signature verification) 
certificates of the provider. The registration process is outside the scope of SEMT. 
5.1 Notation 
Table 1 lists the notation used in the description of the SEMT protocol. Note that in this table, as 
throughout, || is used to denote concatenation of data items. 
Table 1: Notation used in the protocol descriptions 
NOTATION DESCRIPTION 
A The Acquirer. 
Account_Number The Buyer account number with the provider. 
XPK
Cert
 
A certificate for the public encryption key of entity X (i.e. PKX), issued by the 
Provider. 
XV
Cert
 
A certificate for the signature verification key of entity X (i.e. VX) issued by 
the Provider. 
EK(D) The symmetric encryption of data D using secret key K. 
)(De
XPK
 
The asymmetric encryption of data D using the public key of entity X (PKX). 
ENVX(M) The digital envelope on message M intended for recipient X, equal to 
)(||)( KeME
XPKK
, where K is a randomly chosen secret session key. 
Expiry Expiry date of the merchant quotation. 
IDX A string of bits that uniquely identifies entity X within the domain of 
application of the protocol. 
Items Details of the goods, e.g. quantity, description. 
M The Merchant. 
Merchant_URL The Merchant Internet address. 
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Murabaha_Price The price paid to the Provider for the goods by the Buyer, which must equal 
the cost to the Provider plus an agreed profit. 
P The Provider. 
PKX The public encryption key of entity X. 
Price The price of the goods asked by the merchant. 
Quote_ID An identifier that uniquely identifies a quotation. 
Ri Random nonce, i = 1, 2, 3, … 
SX The private signature key of entity X. 
)(MS
XS  
The signature on message M computed using the private signature key of 
entity X. We assume that M can be recovered from the signature; if not, then 
the notation implies that a copy of M is sent with the signature. 
T Date/Time stamp. 
Trans_ID This is an identifier chosen by the provider which uniquely identifies the 
context. 
VX The public signature verification key of entity X. 
 
 The SEMT protocol makes use of the concept of a ‘digital envelope’ for data 
confidentiality, which combines symmetric and asymmetric encryption. The sender of a message 
requiring confidentiality protection first generates a random (‘one time’) secret key for use with a 
symmetric encryption algorithm. This key is then used with the symmetric algorithm to encrypt the 
message. The secret key is then encrypted with the public asymmetric encryption key of the 
intended recipient, and the digital envelope then consists of the concatenation of the 
asymmetrically encrypted random secret key, with the symmetrically encrypted message.  
5.2 SEMT Protocol Description 
We now describe the operation of the four phases of the protocol in detail. We start by listing the 
requirements for use of the protocol. 
5.2.1 Specific requirements 
In order to execute the protocol, the following requirements must be satisfied by the SEMT 
participants. 
1. Each participant X must have two asymmetric key pairs: one pair used for encryption and 
decryption and the other (SX, VX) used for the creation and verification of digital 
signatures. This requirement applies not only to buyers and merchants but also to the 
Provider. 
2. Every buyer has authentic copies of the provider public encryption key PKP and the 
provider public signature verification key VP. 
3. The buyer, the merchant and the provider must be using the same public key encryption 
scheme and the same digital signature scheme, see for example, [4]. 
5.2.2  Transaction request phase 
This phase begins when a buyer, shopping at an Internet merchant site, indicates that he wishes to 
make a specific purchase using SEMT through a specified provider. In return, the merchant 
prepares and signs a quotation to be presented to the provider to complete the sale of the specified 
goods on behalf of the buyer. 
 The quotation prepared by the Merchant contains data related to the goods being offered, 
such as the specified goods information (‘items’), price, validity of  the quotation (‘expiry’) and 
address of the merchant web site (‘Merchant_URL’).  Additionally, the merchant includes in the 
quotation his identifier IDM, the provider identifier IDP, the time T the quotation was prepared and 
a quotation identifier (‘Quote_ID’). The combination of  IDM, IDP, T and Quote_ID is used later by 
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the provider to uniquely identify this quotation. In order to protect the quotation contents from 
eavesdroppers, it is encrypted in a digital envelope constructed using PKP, the public encryption 
key of the provider, an authentic copy of which is possessed by every merchant. 
 After preparing the quotation, the merchant redirects the buyer to the provider with the 
above quotation included in the query string of the redirect message, along with the merchant’s  
signature verification public key certificate
MV
Cert . 
In summary, the following steps are performed. 
1. B→M:  Request to pay using SEMT through P. 
2. M:  Generate ‘quotation’ as  
RL)Merchant_U||expiry||price||items||Quote_ID||||( TID||IDS PMSM . 
3. Set query string to 
MVPPM
TIDID
 
	









ﬀ ||(|||||||| , 
4. M→B:  Redirect B to P. 
5.2.3  Promising phase 
This three-step phase starts every time a buyer is redirected from an Internet merchant site to a 
provider. After receiving the quotation prepared in the transaction request phase and successfully 
decrypting and then verifying the merchant’s signature, the provider starts to negotiate with the 
buyer to assert his willingness to buy the goods specified in the previous phase. 
 When the buyer is redirected to the provider, the query string is also sent to the provider. 
After extracting IDM, IDP, T and ‘Quote_ID’, the provider makes sure that there is no previously 
processed quotation with the same information. Then, using his private key, the Provider first 
decrypts the encrypted quotation. If successful, he uses the merchant signature verification 
certificate 
MV
 
 sent in the query string to verify the merchant’s si gnature on the quotation to 
ensure that the quotation has not been altered by an adversary. 
1. P:  Decrypt and verify ‘quotation’,  
 If the quotation verified successfully, the expiry date is still valid and the provider 
chooses to proceed with the sale, he will calculate his profit (‘Profit’),  and then generate and send 
a Promise-To-Sell message to the buyer that contains: 
IDP||IDB||Trans_ID||T||items||Cost||Profit||Due_Date. 
 In addition to his identifier IDP and the buyer identifier IDB, the provider includes in the 
message a transaction identifier (‘Trans_ID’) to identify the context,  the time the Promise-To-Sell 
was created T, the specified goods information (‘items’), the buying cost of the goods (‘ Cost’), the 
profit requested by him (‘Profit’) and the dat e the provider expects the buyer payment (‘Due 
Date’).  The inclusion of the profit requested by the provider (‘Profit’) in this message  is to satisfy 
the conditions set out in 2.1. Finally, the message is signed and encrypted by the provider and sent 
to the buyer. This message promises the buyer that the provider will sell the requested goods to the 
buyer, once bought from the merchant: 
2. ))--((Env: SellToPromiseSBP
PSB→ , 
 After receiving the message in step 2 and successfully decrypting and then verifying the 
provider signature, the buyer will check that the goods promised by the provider (‘items’) are the 
requested goods. Also, the buyer will check that both the profit (‘Profit’) and the due date 
(‘Due_Date’) offered by the  provider are acceptable to him. If the buyer chooses to proceed with 
sale, then he has to promise the provider that he will buy the goods once the provider has the 
ownership of the goods. This is achieved by generating a Promise-To-Buy message which contains 
the same information received earlier in step 2 from the provider, i.e. Promise-To-Buy = 
(IDB||IDP||Trans_ID||T||items||Cost||Profit ||Due_Date). 
T here represents the time that the buyer created his Promise-To-Buy. Then, the buyer signs and 
encrypts the Promise-to-Buy message and sends it, along with its signature verification certificate, 
to the provider. The Promise-To-Buy message is encrypted to protect the contents against 
eavesdroppers: 
3. ))((Env: Buy-To-PromiseSPB
BSP→ || BV
 
. 
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5.2.4  Purchase phase 
When the Provider receives the Promise-To-Buy message from the buyer, he decrypts it and then 
verifies the buyer signature to ascertain the integrity of the received message. 
 Assuming that the provider is using the SET protocol to submit payment to the merchant, 
the provider generates a SET protocol Pay-Request message based on the goods description 
(‘items’) contained in Promise-To-Buy received from the buyer. The provider send this message to 
the merchant web site address (‘Merchant URL’) specified previously in the Transaction request 
phase. 
1. P→M:  Pay-Request, 
 The merchant uses the Pay-Request message to produce a SET protocol Auth-Request 
message asking authorisation from the acquirer. Note that a SET protocol option must be set to 
make the Auth-Request / Auth-Response message exchange result in the actual transfer of money, 
i.e. simultaneous authorisation and capture. 
2. M→A:  Auth-Request, 
 The Acquirer goes through the financial network to obtain payment authorisation. If 
successful, it generates and digitally signs a SET protocol authorisation response message Auth-
Response, indicating success or failure and the actual captured amount. 
3. A→M:  Auth-Response, 
 The Merchant obtains the authorisation response message Auth-Response and verifies the 
Acquirer’s signature. The Merchant then gen erates and digitally signs a SET protocol Pay-
Response message and transmits it to the provider: 
4. M→P:  Pay-Response, 
 In order to give the buyer evidence that the provider has bought the goods, the provider 
must forward the response message Pay-Response received from the merchant to the buyer: 
5. ))||items ||Trans_ID||||((Env  : Response-PayIDIDSBP BPSB P→ . 
 This message will be used to convince the buyer to complete the next phase. The buyer 
can see if the acquirer has authorised the payment since it is indicated in the data fields AuthStatus 
and CapStatus within the Pay-Response. 
 Whilst the Purchase phase described above is based on SET, other methods of Internet 
payment could easily be used to complete the transaction. SET has been used here primarily for 
the purposes of illustration. 
5.2.5  Murabaha phase 
Once the buyer receives the message sent in step 5 of the Purchase phase, he decrypts and then 
verifies the merchant signature. The buyer retrieves AuthStatus and CapStatus from the Pay-
Response, and validates that the acquirer has authorised the payment, i.e. the provider has bought 
the goods. If convinced, the buyer will send his payment authorisation to the provider using the 
following Murabaha-Payment message: 
B→P: 
Due_Date))||riceMurabaha_P||items||||Trans_ID ||mberAccount_Nu||||((Env TIDIDS PBSP B  
6. Security analysis 
In this section, we examine to what extent the generic security requirements outlined in section 4.2 
are met by the SEMT protocol. 
 SEMT is similar to the traditional SET protocol in that it provides confidentiality and 
integrity for payment information using public key cryptography. Moreover, it uses digital 
signatures to authenticate all parties involved in the payment process. However, there are two 
differences. The first is that the buyer does not submit his payment information through the 
merchant as in SET. The second difference is that SEMT involves two separate transactions, one 
between the provider and the merchant, and the other between the buyer and the provider. On the 
other hand, SEMT is similar to 3-D Secure [7] in that the issuer must be involved in every 
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transaction. However, 3-D Secure does not require the buyer to have a digital certificate. Instead 
SSL is used to secure communication between the cardholder and the merchant. 
6.1 Confidentiality 
All transaction information (e.g. pricing and payment details) in SEMT is encrypted. An attacker 
cannot recover messages exchanged between a buyer and the provider because all messages are 
encrypted before transmission. An advantage of SEMT is that the buyer does not need to send any 
private information via the merchant, unlike in conventional e-commerce schemes where a credit 
card number is sent to a merchant protected using SSL/TLS. This avoids any concerns regarding 
the ability of the merchant to store buyer private information in a secure manner. Moreover, this 
keeps the identity of the buyer anonymous to the merchant, since the buyer need not reveal his 
identity to anyone but the provider. 
6.2 Authentication 
Authentication in SEMT is accomplished using digital signatures and public key certificates [4]. 
An attacker cannot impersonate another participant except by stealing that participant’s private 
signature key. 
1. The Buyer needs to authenticate the provider: This requirement is met, because the buyer 
can verify the signature received in the Promise-To-Sell message of the Promising phase, 
using the provider signature verification key found in his certificate. 
2. The provider needs to authenticate the buyer: This requirement is met, because the 
provider can verify the buyer signature received in the Promise-To-Buy message of the 
Promising phase, using the buyer signature verification key. 
6.3 Integrity 
Integrity in the secure electronic Murabaha transaction is accomplished using digital signatures. 
Signing a message with the sender’s private key provides  evidence that the message content has 
not been altered or destroyed, accidentally or with malicious intent, since it was signed. 
1. The buyer must be aware of the goods original price and the amount of profit the 
provider is charging him before buying the goods: This requirement is met, because the 
buyer signs the original price Cost, and the amount of profit the provider is adding, the 
Profit, is included in the Promise-To-Buy message sent to the provider. 
2. The buyer requires evidence that the provider owns the goods being offered: This 
requirement is met, because the buyer can verify the merchant signature on the Pay-
Response message of the transaction phase, and that AuthStatus and CapStatus are set. 
3. The provider need a proof that the buyer has authorised the payment for the goods using 
Murabaha sale: This requirement is met, because the buyer signs the Murabaha-Payment 
message in the Murabaha phase, and the Provider can verify the buyer signature using the 
buyer’s signature verification key VB. 
4. No attacker can authorise a false payment on behalf of a buyer: Buyer authorisation is 
achieved by sending the buyer account number signed within the Murabaha-Payment 
message of the payment phase, and no one but the buyer has the private key necessary to 
create the required signature. The only way this can be attacked is by stealing the buyer 
private signature key. Adding a user PIN can provide some defence in the event that the 
buyer’s signature key is compromised. 
5. The buyer payment authorisation must be protected against alteration, or any alteration 
must be detectable: This requirement is met, because the payment authorisation supplied 
by the buyer to the provider during the Murabaha phase must be signed by the buyer. 
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7 Conclusions 
In this paper, we have proposed the Secure Electronic Murabaha Transaction (SEMT) protocol 
that provides a secure Murabaha sale service on the Internet. We described the protocol in detail, 
and explained how it meets the identified security requirements. In future work, we intend to 
modify SEMT to support sales over wireless networks. Other possible future work includes 
investigating the possibility of porting other sales models based on Islamic banking to the Internet. 
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